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Copyrighting Twilight: Digital Copyright Lessons from the Vampire Blogosphere
Jacqueline D. Lipton*

Abstract
In January of 2010 a United States District Court granted an injunction against
a Twilight fan magazine for unauthorized use of copyrighted publicity stills1. No
surprise there. Intellectual property laws deal effectively – some would argue
too effectively – with such cases. Nevertheless, recent Web 2.0 technologies,
characterized by user-generated content, raise new challenges for copyright law.
Online interactions involving reproductions of copyrighted works in blogs, online
fan fiction, and online social networks do not comfortably fit existing copyright
paradigms. It is unclear whether participants in Web 2.0 forums are creating
derivative works, making legitimate fair uses of copyright works, or engaging in
acts of digital copyright piracy and plagiarism. As online conduct becomes more
interactive, copyright laws are less effective in creating clear signals about
proscribed conduct. This article examines the application of copyright law to
Web 2.0 technologies. It suggests that social norms must take on greater
significance because of the community-oriented nature of much of today’s online
conduct. The discussion is organized around four case studies based on the
popular Twilight book and movie franchise. These case studies illuminate the
relationship between copyright norms and laws in the Web 2.0 context. The
author draws lessons from these case studies that might inform future
developments in copyright law and policy that would better align laws with
expectations of Web 2.0 participants. Twilight is chosen as the focal point
because of the complex online relationships that have developed in recent years
between the various copyright stakeholders: the book author; movie directors;
producers and distributors of the books and movies; actors and production
crews; and, the fans.
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Introduction
“I did not want my readers to experience Midnight Sun before it was completed, edited and
published. I think it is important for everybody to understand that what happened was a huge
violation of my rights as an author …. As the author of the Twilight Saga, I control the copyright
and it is up to the owner of the copyright to decide when the books should be made public ….
Unfortunately, with the Internet, it is easy for people to obtain and share items that do not
legally belong to them. …. This has been a very upsetting experience for me, but I hope it will at
least leave my fans with a better understanding of copyright and the importance of artistic
control.” 2

These are the words of Stephenie Meyer, the author of the popular Twilight books, about
the leak of a draft manuscript and its dissemination over the Internet. While production was
underway on the film adaptation of the first book (Twilight), Meyer was working on a new
project (Midnight Sun) that retold the story of Twilight from a different perspective. Twilight is
narrated by the series’ heroine, Bella Swan, while Midnight Sun retells the same events from the
perspective of her love interest, the vampire Edward Cullen. Meyer had released early drafts of
Midnight Sun to some of the people involved in production of the Twilight movie. The
manuscript had been leaked and had reappeared on the Internet. Meyer was extremely upset.
She subsequently posted her own “official” version of the Midnight Sun manuscript on her
website. Along with the posting, she urged her fans not to read any versions of the uncompleted

2

Stephenie Meyer, Midnight Sun: Edward’s Version of Twilight (available at The Official Website of
Stephenie Meyer, http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun.html, last viewed on January 12, 2010).
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text. However, she noted, if fans felt compelled to read any version, they should read the version
that she had posted3.
New Web 2.0 participatory technologies, such as blogs and online social networks
(OSNs), enable consumers more readily to interact with digital works online4. These
technologies enable original creators of works, such as Meyer, to communicate with their fans
about their works. Meyer actively maintains digital contact with her fans, cross-linking to their
blogs5, and updating them on her work6. She also routinely comments on how she would like
her work to be experienced. Her request about avoiding unauthorized versions of Midnight Sun
is an example of this approach. She has also asked fans not to post “spoilers” about forthcoming
works7, and to remove specific materials from their websites at certain times so as not to
interfere with the release of new movies and books8. The relationship between Meyer and her
fans is an example of the way in which Web 2.0 technologies enable today’s authors and artists
actively to engage in discourse with their fans9. These communications take place in forums
such as blogs, wikis and OSNs. Authors can communicate with their audiences about how they
would like their works to be experienced, and fans can respond in kind through media such as
text, mash-up videos, and fan fiction10.
One advantage of these forums for copyright law and policy makers is the amount of
anecdotal data they incorporate about emerging social norms and expectations surrounding
copyright works from a variety of perspectives. Previously, commercial publishers, producers,
and distributors took center stage in debates about appropriate legal protections for copyrighted
3

id. (“I'd rather my fans not read this version of Midnight Sun. It was only an incomplete draft; the writing is
messy and flawed and full of mistakes. But how do I comment on this violation without driving more people to look
for the illegal posting?”)
4
DAVID KESMODEL, THE DOMAIN GAME: HOW PEOPLE GET RICH FROM INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES, 126
(2008) (“Web 2.0 was a buzz word used to describe a new wave of Web businesses that leveraged social
networking, user-generated content, and other forms of collaboration and information-sharing on the Internet.”);
JANET LOWE, GOOGLE SPEAKS: SECRETS OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST BILLIONAIRE ENTREPRENEURS, SERGEY BRIN
AND LARRY PAGE, 294 (2009) (defining “Web 2.0” as “A term used to describe an evolving generation of a
participatory Web. Web 2.0 describes the proliferation of interconnectivity and social interaction on the World
Wide Web.”)
5
See http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/ts_fansites.html, last viewed on January 30, 2010.
6
See http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/index.html, last viewed on January 30, 2010.
7
See, for example, http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/breakingdawn.html (“Speaking of spoilers, I want to ask
you guys for a favor. As we saw with Eclipse (not to mention that last Harry Potter book), there is always the
potential for copies of the book to be leaked early. My publisher is doing everything they can to prevent this, but
there is only so much that can be done. This is the favor: if someone, somewhere, somehow, gets a copy early, I'm
asking you to please not post any spoilers on the internet. And if you see something, please don't spread it around.
Breaking Dawn was meant to be experienced in a certain way, and I would hate for someone to get that experience
ruined by seeing something online they didn't want to see. My fans have been super cool about this in the past—last
year in particular you guys went above and beyond to protect Eclipse until the release date—and I hope that we'll
have the same positive experience this year.”), last viewed on January 30, 2010.
8
id. (“Another thing you may notice close to the release of Breaking Dawn is that the message boards on
several fansites will be taken down. They are doing this as a favor to me because I want to protect you all from
stumbling upon something that could ruin the book for you. There will be plenty of time to discuss all the details of
the book after August 2nd.”), last viewed on January 30, 2010.
9
KESMODEL, supra note ___, at 126; LOWE, supra note ___, at 294 (definitions of Web 2.0 technologies).
10
Aaron Schwabach, The Harry Potter Lexicon and the World of Fandom: Fan Fiction, Outsider Works, and
Copyright, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 387 (2009) (discussion of the interaction of fan fiction with copyright law).
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works11. Today, multiple stake-holders’ perspectives are widely available, including the views
of authors and other original artists, as well as views of their fans. The lines between consumers
and creators have also blurred. Consumers have increasingly become creators12. The ability of
consumers to themselves create, and to communicate with original authors, profoundly alters the
matrix of norms and expectations surrounding uses of copyrighted works online. While previous
online intellectual property battles focused on preventing digital copyright piracy in the face of
early digital technologies, Web 2.0 issues are more nuanced and complex.
Web 2.0 technologies implicate activities of new groups of copyright users in new
contexts. Web 2.0 forums, including OSNs13, blogs14, wikis15, and virtual worlds16, have
supported the development of online communities of consumer-creators. These communities are
developing their own norms and expectations relating to the use of creative works online17.
Much Web 2.0 conduct does not fit neatly within existing intellectual property paradigms.
Copyright law, for example, aims to incentivize artistic innovation by prohibiting free-riding on
the works of others, usually in the commercial arena18. Newer online consumer-creator
communities generally engage in conduct that is not motivated by commercial profit. The
rewards of much of this conduct lie in communicative and reputational value rather than making

11

See, for example, Summit Entertainment v Beckett Media, 2010 WL 147958 (C.D. Cal.); Not Reported in F.
Supp. 2d (action by movie studio against unauthorized fan magazine for copyright infringement).
12
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY, 108 (2008)
(noting the capacity that remix technologies give the new generation of digital natives in terms of the potential to
remix text, images, film and music) [hereinafter, REMIX]; JOHN PALFREY and URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES, 131-132 (2008)(“The most creative young people
are interacting with news, works of entertainment, and other information in ways that were unimaginable a few
years ago. These young people are not passive consumers of media that is broadcast to them, but rather active
participants in the making of meaning in their culture. Their art form of the remix, where digital files are combined
to create a new video or audio file, is already having an effect on cultural understanding around the world.”)
13
Such as Facebook and MySpace (see www.facebook.com, www.myspace.com, last viewed on January 30,
2010). See also LOWE, supra note ___, at 292 (defining “social networking” as “Websites that allow people to share
ideas, information, and images and to form networks with friends, family, or other like-minded individuals”.)
14
LOWE, supra note ___, at 288 (2009) (defining “blog” as “Short for Web log, or a string of journal entries
posted on a web page”.); PALFREY and GASSER, supra note ___, at 345 (defining “blogs” as “Online journals written
by individuals, ordinarily the unedited voice of a single person. The term derivces from “web log.” Blogs are
becoming an increasingly popular source of news. More and more people, young and old, are writing and reading
blogs.”)
15
LOWE, supra note ___, at 294 (defining “wikis” as “A collection of Web pages that enables anyone who
accesses them to contribute or modify content, using a simplified computer language.”)
16
PALFREY and GASSER, supra note ___, at 28-29 (describing the operation of virtual worlds, like Second
Life, as online environments where participants can form their own identities and interact with others
pseydonymously).
17
Steven Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869
(2009) (examining positive aspects of allowing social norms to function as a regulator of fan fiction activities
online)
18
MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 24-25 (4 ed, 2005) (“On the one hand, copyright
law provides the incentive to create information and a shelter to develop and protect it. On the other hand, the
copyright monopoly is a limited one – limited in time and scope by such doctrines as idea/expression, originality,
and fair use. Viewed in this way, copyright law represents an economic tradeoff between encouraging the optimal
creation of works of authorship through monopoly incentives, and providing for their optimal access, use, and
distribution through limiting doctrines.”)
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unjust profits from someone else’s work19. It is unclear whether, and to what extent, copyright
law can – or should – impact some of this conduct.
This article argues that copyright law and policy makers should now take full advantage
of the exponentially increasing amount of information currently available in the blogosphere
about emerging norms and expectations governing the use of copyright works online. It utilizes
four case studies involving the Twilight book and movie franchise to illustrate the kinds of norms
that appear to be emerging amongst a variety of copyright stakeholders (no pun intended). Part I
provides a general outline of the challenges posed to existing copyright paradigms by Web 2.0
technologies. Part II presents four case studies involving the interaction of copyright law and
online norms in the context of the Twilight book and movie franchise. Part III extrapolates
lessons from the case studies that might guide future developments in Web 2.0 law and policy.
Part IV sets out some conclusions about the future of copyright law in the digital age.
I.

Copyright and Web 2.0 Forums

Because of their interactive and largely non-commercial nature, Web 2.0 technologies
raise new challenges for the legal system. These challenges are particularly pronounced in the
case of intellectual property laws which have tended to focus on the protection of economic
rights20. Web 2.0 participants – such as bloggers and participants in OSNs – are not typically
motivated by financial reward. Fans share information about copyrighted works online. They
often also post short movie clips or video mash-ups on blogs and other online forums. They are
very different groups of people with a very different set of motivations for their conduct than the
copyright pirates at whose conduct existing laws are aimed.
Online fans are also likely to be widely dispersed geographically, thus raising another set
of challenges for copyright law. The domestic nature of copyright law, even as augmented by
international agreements21, creates jurisdictional limitations. It can also be difficult to identify an
19

For example, the pseudonymous author Cassandra Clare parlayed her popularity in the fan fiction world
into contracting for her own series of popular commercial novels. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cassandra_Clare, last viewed on February 1, 2010 (“Cassandra Clare is the pseudonym
of the bestselling author of the young adult trilogy The Mortal Instruments. …. She started working on her novel
City of Bones in 2004, inspired by the urban landscape of Manhattan…. Prior to the publishing of City of Bones,
Clare was known for writing fan fiction under the similar pseudonym Cassandra Claire. Her main works were The
Draco Trilogy (Harry Potter) and The Very Secret Diaries (The Lord of the Rings). Claire was considered a Big
Name Fan and was covered in several newspaper articles about fan fiction: The Draco Trilogy was described by The
Times as a "gem of such superlative quality that it enhances one's appreciation of the Harry Potter series" and The
Daily Telegraph called The Very Secret Diaries a "cult classic". However, she has also been accused of plagiarism
from within the fan fiction community, and became embroiled in a long lasting controversy.”)
20
LEAFFER, supra note ___, at 22 (“By implication, the Constitution recognizes that copyright law plays an
important role in our market economy. Rather than encouraging production of works by governmental subsidy, or
awards or prizes, the author is given, through the limited monopoly of copyright law, a private property right over
his creation, the worth of which will ultimately be determined by the market. The underlying policy of this
constitutional provision is to promote the public welfare through private market incentives.”)
21
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (text available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html, last viewed on January 30, 2010); WIPO Copyright Treaty (text
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/, last viewed on January 30, 2010); WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (text available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/, last viewed on January 30, 2010);
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) (text available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04_e.htm, last viewed on January 30, 2010).
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alleged wrongdoer in an online forum22. If the alleged infringer can be identified, it may be
difficult for a copyright holder to assert jurisdiction over her. Even if jurisdiction can be
established, there is the additional problem of bad publicity where copyright owners and
licensees bring actions against their own customers23.
Because of the geographically dispersed nature of much online conduct, and the new set
of stakeholders involved in Web 2.0 forums, commentators have suggested the need to develop
multi-modal approaches to regulating online conduct, both in the intellectual property area and in
other areas. In the early days of the Internet, Professor Lessig famously promoted system
architecture, or software code, as a key regulator of online conduct24. He also identified other
important regulatory modalities, including market forces and social norms25. Other
commentators have identified additional modes of regulation, including public education, and the
use of non-profit institutions to develop effective regulations for online behavior26.
Because the focus of this article is on online communities organized around particular
artistic works, the key modes of regulation considered here are legal rules and social norms.
This is because social norms are an extremely important form of regulation within cohesive
communities27. Norms can, in fact, be more powerful regulators than laws because the sanctions
for infringing norms can be more immediate and more consistently enforced than the sanctions
for infringing laws. The problem with norms in the online context, particularly with respect to
Web 2.0 forums, is that many norms are in their infancy because of the newness of the
technologies and of the communities developing around them. As the communities become
more well established, norms will be more easily identifiable and may become more entrenched
and more consistently enforced.
A major advantage of modern Web 2.0 technologies is that they enable identification of
norms and expectations from multiple perspectives, including those of authors, creators,
consumers, producers, and distributors. Many of these groups have not previously been well
represented in intellectual property debates. Looking at the complete matrix of perspectives will
help regulators to enact and enforce laws that better meet the needs of the larger community,
rather than focusing on the one or two interest groups that have the greatest lobbying power. In
other words, Web 2.0 technologies enable more voices to come to the regulatory table, if
regulators are willing to listen.
22

See, for example, In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc.257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003) (copyright
holders seeking identities of alleged digital copyright infringers from Internet service provider).
23
Of course, on occasion copyright holders do take legal actions directly against their customers. See, for
example, BMG Music v Gonzalez, 2005 U.S. App LEXIS 26903 (7th Cir. 2005) (copyright holder bringing action
against individual file sharer for copyright infringement).
24
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0, 5 (2006) (“In real space, we recognize how laws regulate – through
constitutions, statutes, and other legal codes. In cyberspace we must understand how a different “code” regulates –
how the software and hardware (i.e., the “code” of cyberspace) that make cyberspace what it is also regulate
cyberspace as it is.”) [hereinafter, CODE]
25
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARVARD L REV 501, 507
(1999) [hereinafter, Law of the Horse].
26
See, for example, Jacqueline Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital
Video, forthcoming, IOWA LAW REVIEW, 2010 [hereinafter, “We, the Paparazzi”].
27
Lessig, Law of the Horse, supra note ___, at 513 (“In a small and closely knit community, norms might be
the optimal mode of regulation…”)

Copyrighting “Twilight”

7

It is also important for regulators to remember that laws have an expressive function as
well as an enforcement role28. Where possible, what the law expresses should conform in some
measure to society’s expectations about permissible and impermissible uses of copyrighted
works. While different stakeholders’ views about copyrighted works will not always align, it is
important that legal regulators give some thought to the balance between competing interests in
these works. One-sided laws run the risk of being honored more in the breach than in the
observance29. Copyright has proved particularly problematic in this context because of its
emphasis on the protection of economic rights often to the detriment of free speech30 and
sometimes even to the detriment of the author’s own rights in a work she has created31.
II. Copyrighting Twilight: Four Case Studies in Web 2.0 Norms
A. Why Twilight?
Twilight presents some excellent case studies for an examination of the interaction
between Web 2.0 norms and copyright laws. Because of the popularity of the series, there is a
significant amount of online activity surrounding the books and films32. The Twilight series also
appeals to a wide cross section of people, including the younger and very tech-savvy digital
natives33, as well as older digital immigrants34. While it is probably true to say that the franchise
appeals more to women than men, this may not matter for the purposes of an early attempt at
identifying interactions between Web 2.0 norms and copyright laws. However, it is possible that
a work that appeals more directly to men could raise a different series of norms. A discussion of
gender - and for that matter racial - differences in the online context is beyond the scope of this
article. However, it may be a fruitful avenue for future research.

28

Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 373, 407 (2009) (“Law has an important expressive character beyond its coercive one. Law creates a public set
of meanings and shared understandings between the state and the public. It clarifies, and draws attention to, the
behavior it prohibits. Law's expressed meaning serves mutually reinforcing purposes. Law educates the public
about what is socially harmful. This legitimates harms, allowing the harmed party to see herself as harmed. It signals
appropriate behavior. In drawing attention to socially appropriate behavior, law permits individuals to take these
social meanings into account when deciding on their actions. Because law creates and shapes social mores, it has an
important cultural impact that differs from its more direct coercive effects.”)
29
LESSIG, REMIX, supra note ___, at 44 (2009) (“Even the good become pirates in a world where the rules
seem absurd.”)
30
David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U PA L REV 673 (2000)
(exploring the delicate balance between copyrights and First Amendment guarantees).
31
For example, where the author has assigned copyright to a third party and later objects to the way in which
the copyright holder chooses to exploit the work. One example of this has been the case of colorization of films
originally made in black and white, where the copyright owner who seeks to colorize the films is not the original
author: see LEAFFER, supra note ___, at 376, n. 423.
32
See, for example, a list of Twilight websites officially recognized by the series’ author, Stephenie Meyer:
http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/ts_fansites.html, last viewed on January 30, 2010.
33
PALFREY and GASSER, supra note ___, at 346 (defining “digital native” as “A person born into the digital
age (after 1980) who has access to networked digital technologies and strong computer skills and knowledge.
Digital Natives share a common global culture that is defined not strictly by age but by certain attributes and
experiences related to how they interact with information technologies, information itself, one another, and other
people and institutions.”)
34
id. (defining “digital immigrant” as “A person who has adopted the Internet and related technologies, but
who was born prior to the advent of the digital age.”)
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Twilight is also a useful focal point for this discussion because the author of the novels,
Stephenie Meyer, is an active participant in the blogosphere herself. She maintains a blog where
she both updates her readers on developments with her work, and also links to fan websites35.
She actively participates with her fans in discussions of her work. She cites comments of her
readers on her blog36, and shares outtakes from her early draft novels with her fans37. She has
also been actively involved in the development of the movies adapted from her novels, including
taking a small cameo role in the first Twilight film. Meyer is in an interesting position as a
creator who communicates and collaborates regularly with her audience as well as with the
upstream translators of her work into new media. Meyer is obviously not the first copyright
creator to communicate online with fans and commercial adaptors of her work38. However, the
immense popularity of her work and the scope and scale on which she communicates with other
stakeholders creates a significant amount of information about emerging copyright norms.
The Twilight franchise has also generated a huge volume of online fan commentary
because so many different aspects of the books and films have attracted a fan base. Fans have
been attracted to the original books, and then subsequently have been intrigued by the
adaptations of the books into movies. Fans have become obsessed with a number of the actors
and directors involved in the film franchise and there are now large numbers of unauthorized fan
websites devoted to the lead actors, Kristen Stewart, Robert Pattinson, and Taylor Lautner39.
The franchise has also spawned significant amounts of online fan fiction, where fans retell the
stories from different characters’ perspectives, or tell different aspects of the stories in their own
voices40. Again, this fan activity inherently provides a variety of perspectives on appropriate
uses of copyrighted works in the blogosphere.
Twilight is also a very current example of attitudes to copyrighted works online. The
books were published between 2005 and 200841. The first movie was released in November of
2008, the second in November of 2009, and the third is scheduled for June of 2010. Thus the
information about emerging online uses of the copyrighted material is very up-to-date and can be
derived from fan websites42, Stephenie Meyer’s official blog43, and websites administered by the
movie production company, Summit Entertainment44.

35

See www.stepheniemeyer.com, last viewed on January 30, 2010.
See http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/twilight_reviews.html, last viewed on January 30, 2010.
37
See http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/twilight_outtakes.html, last viewed on January 30, 2010.
38
For example, Cassandra Clare, author of the popular Mortal Instruments trilogy has a website where she
answers questions from fan and discussed possible movie adaptations of her work:
http://cassandraclare.com/cms/home, last viewed on January 30, 2010.
39
See, for example, www.kristenstewart.com (Kristen Stewart fan website, last viewed on January 30, 2010);
http://www.taylorlautner.org/ (Taylor Lautner fan website, last viewed on January 30, 2010);
robsessedpattinson.com (Robert Pattinson fan website, last viewed in January 30, 2010).
40
See, for example, http://www.fanfiction.net/book/Twilight/ (Twilight fan fiction website, last viewed on
January 30, 2010).
41
STEPHENIE MEYER, TWILIGHT (2005); STEPHENIE MEYER, NEW MOON (2006), STEPHENIE MEYER, ECLIPSE
(2007), STEPHENIE MEYER, BREAKING DAWN (2008).
42
See, for example, a list of Twilight websites officially recognized by the series’ author, Stephenie Meyer:
http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/ts_fansites.html, last viewed on January 30, 2010.
43
See www.stepheniemeyer.com, last viewed on February 1, 2010.
44
See http://www.twilightthemovie.com/, last viewed on February 1, 2010.
36
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The franchise is also notable for the variety of Internet issues that have arisen recently
about intellectual property rights associated with the books and movies. Some of the more
salient of these issues form the basis of the following discussion. The first case study presented
here relates to the leaking of Stephenie Meyer’s Midnight Sun manuscript. The second case
study examines the phenomenon of fan mash-up videos45 posted on popular web hosting services
such as YouTube, and often also reproduced on fan blogs. The third case study examines an
incident in a movie theater in Illinois in which some Twilight fans hosted a birthday party which
included attending a screening of New Moon. The sister of the birthday girl made a video
recording of the party, which included capturing a few minutes of footage of the film on video46.
She was detained in jail for two days with the possibility of facing a larger jail term for criminal
copyright infringement47.
The final case study is an interesting example of turnabout in digital copyright law.
While many copyright disputes involve commercial copyright holders – often music and movie
producers – taking action against smaller players, including fans, for unauthorized uses of their
protected works, this case study involves fans taking action against a commercial movie
producer. The complainants were fans who run a website devoted to one of the leading men in
the Twilight movies, Robert Pattinson. While a variety of unauthorized fan websites have
appeared in recent years following Pattinson’s work, the administrators of the
“robsessedpattinson.com” blog were particularly irritated that a commercial DVD production
company had cut and pasted information about Pattinson from their blog to promote an
unauthorized commercially released DVD documentary on Pattinson’s career. The owners of
“robsessedpattinson.com” framed their complaints against the Robsessed DVD makers in terms
of plagiarism, rather than copyright infringement. While their strategy ultimately worked in
practice, in that the DVD makers removed the offending material from their website, the
plagiarism terminology employed by the complainants may tell us something about the level of
awareness and effectiveness of copyright law in Web 2.0 communities.
B. Case Study 1: Midnight Sun
As noted above, Midnight Sun was Stephenie Meyer’s attempt to retell the story of her
first Twilight novel from an alternate character’s point of view. While Twilight recounts the tale
from Bella Swan’s viewpoint, Midnight Sun was intended to tell the story from the perspective of
her love interest, the vampire Edward Cullen. As described by Meyer, Midnight Sun started out
as “an exercise in character development that got wildly out of hand”48. While editing on some
of her later books, she had become interested in the idea of exploring how Edward reacted to first
meeting Bella, given that there was so much more in terms of character development going on
for Edward at the point where the two characters first become aware of each other than there is
for Bella49. At this point in the narrative, Bella only knows that “an incredibly gorgeous boy is
45

Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1509 (2008) (defining
“mashups” as “works that incorporate - i.e., "mashup" or "remix" - portions of copyrighted material from elsewhere
into their works.”)
46
Eric Ditzian, Chris Weitz Says “New Moon” Bootlegging Arrest is “Terribly Unfair”, available at
http://www.mtv.com/movies/news/articles/1627907/story.jhtml, last viewed on February 2, 1010.
47
id.
48
See http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun.html, last viewed on February 1, 2010.
49
id.
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looking at her funny.”50 Edward, on the other hand, has one hundred years’ worth of passively
wandering through life as a vampire completely altered when he first encounters Bella, or, as
Meyer puts it, “Edward is suffering through one of the most momentous days of his very long
life!”51
In 2006, Stephenie Meyer posted a draft of the first chapter of Midnight Sun on her
website for her readers to enjoy. She explained in an accompanying note that: “this is an
unedited rough draft. It is full of typos and all the other flaws that unedited manuscripts have.
Enjoy it for what it is, but know that the final copy will be infinitely superior.”52 That was the
only official thing Meyer posted on her blog about Midnight Sun until a message to her fans was
reproduced on her website in June of 2008 assuring readers that the completion of Midnight Sun
would be her next project53. She continued working on the manuscript in 2008 and, around this
time, released confidential drafts of what she had written so far to actors and others involved in
production of the first Twilight film to assist with character and plot development for the
movie54.
Subsequently, various unauthorized drafts of the manuscript started appearing on the
Internet. Meyer was extremely upset, and responded in an interesting way. Despite the fact that
she was fairly sure she knew who had leaked the manuscript, she did not take any formal legal
action, nor did she name anyone she thought may have been involved. In a blog post on her
website in August of 2008, she noted that: “I have a good idea of how the leak happened as
there were very few copies of Midnight Sun that left my possession and each was unique. Due to
little changes I made to the manuscript at different times, I can tell when each left my possession
and to whom it was given. The manuscript that was illegally distributed on the Internet was
given to trusted individuals for a good purpose. I have no comment beyond that as [sic] I believe
that there was no malicious intent with the initial distribution.”55
While she notes that the Internet distribution was “illegal” in terms of infringing her
copyright, she also notes the significance of the intentions of the people who inadvertently
leaked the manuscript. Meyer interestingly attaches significance to the intentions of those
infringing her copyrights, despite the fact that copyright law involves strict liability56. It turns
out that the notion of intention seems fairly significant in terms of copyright infringement in the
blogosphere, as the next case study also demonstrates57. Under our present legal system,
intention is only relevant to certain forms of secondary liability – notably contributory liability58.
50

id.
id.
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id.
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id. (“June 2008 Update: In response to the outrageous number of emails that I have received with
questions concerning Midnight Sun, I talked to Stephenie this weekend and she asked me to let everyone know that
Midnight Sun is her next project.”)
54
id.
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id.
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NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01 (“Reduced to most fundamental terms, there are only two elements
necessary to the plaintiff's case in an infringement action: ownership of the copyright by the plaintiff and copying by
the defendant.” In other words, the plaintiff does not have to establish intent on the part of the defendant.)
57
See Part II.C.1, infra.
58
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12.04[A][3][a] (“A party “who, with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory
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It is not currently an element of a direct infringement action59. The examples drawn from the
Twilight blogosphere suggest that perhaps Congress should consider revisiting the role of
intention in digital copyright infringement.
Another interesting aspect of Meyer’s response to the illegal posting of her work was her
decision to publish her own more official version of the current draft on her blog60. She
accompanied this version with an explanation of her motives: “I'd rather my fans not read this
version of Midnight Sun. It was only an incomplete draft; the writing is messy and flawed and
full of mistakes. But how do I comment on this violation without driving more people to look for
the illegal posting? It has taken me a while to decide how and if I could respond. But to end the
confusion, I've decided to make the draft available here …. This way, my readers don't have to
feel they have to make a sacrifice to stay honest”61.
These comments are instructive on the author’s feelings about copyright and authorial
integrity. Again, Meyer uses words and phrases that relate to the intentions of her fans with
respect to her copyrights. She talks about the “violation” of her rights and her fear that if she
comments on this violation she will drive her fans to look for illegal postings. Her own posting
of the draft is a solution that she feels will allow her readers the opportunity to enjoy her work
and to “stay honest.” In many ways, the current copyright system leaves the author in an
extremely difficult position. The more she talks about her rights under the system, the more she
alerts people to the availability of the illegally distributed work. Thus, her rights do not really
help her in the Web 2.0 context unless she is willing to personally bargain with - or take legal
action against - every website where the illegal copies are posted. And even if she has the time,
the wherewithal, and the desire to do so, more websites are likely to spring up every day, and
many will be outside the jurisdictional reach of domestic copyright laws. Additionally, their
proprietors may be difficult to locate in practice.
Alternatively, she could attempt to bring actions against search engines as parties
potentially secondarily liable for these direct infringements. However, this is a costly and time
consuming process, and the law is unsettled about the liability of search engines for secondary
liability in these kinds of cases62. In the case of an unpublished work, like Midnight Sun, there is
no commercial publisher or distributor with deep pockets who might shoulder some of the
burden of bringing legal actions against unauthorized online distributors of the work. This may
be contrasted with online copies of clips from the Twilight films found from time to time on
infringer.' " Thus, if there is knowledge that the work in question constitutes an infringement, then one who causes
another to infringe will himself be liable as an infringer”).
59
LEAFFER, supra note __, at 522 (“In general, infringement with innocent intent is not a defense to a finding
of liability. Outside of one narrowly drawn provision in the Act, infringement of copyright is a strict liability rule,
where intent of the copier is not relevant in determining the fact of liability.”)
60
See http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun.html, last viewed on February 1, 2010.
61
id.
62
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12.04[A][3][a] (noting current inconsistencies in application of secondary
liability law for copyright infringement to Internet intermediaries such as Internet search engines and online
payments systems); Anne Flahvin, Online Copyright Battle Just Beginning with Landmark Case, THE AUSTRALIAN
(February 5, 2010), available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/online-copyright-battle-justbeginning/story-e6frg97x-1225826898277, last viewed on February 5, 2010) (noting that Australian court just
controversially held ISP not to be liable for copyright infringements of its users).
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websites like YouTube, but quickly removed as a result of copyright claims by legal departments
at the deep-pocketed movie studio.
Meyer’s comments also illustrate her feelings towards her fans. She understands that
they are interested in her work and want to hear the Twilight story as she is planning to tell it
from Edward Cullen’s point of view. She wants her fans to be able to enjoy her work and to
“stay honest” in the process. However, she would prefer to have more control over when and on
what terms her fans enjoy particular works. She hopes her fans will respect her wishes and not
read anything before she is ready to share it, but she understands how strongly her fans feel about
keeping on top of her work and likely also how much she owes her fans in terms of her success.
Thus, she tries to come up with a compromise that caters in some way to her fans’ desires, but
does not impinge too greatly on her artistic integrity. Copyright law does not really help her to
achieve any of this. She has to set out her own preferred terms of access and use for the work
and to hope that her fans respect them. She does this against the backdrop of copyright
ownership in the manuscript, but the copyright law does not give her any rights that she can use
meaningfully to redress the specific wrong – the authorial artistic violation - she feels that she
has suffered.
The way in which she describes this wrong is interesting because it says more about how
she feels about her authorial autonomy and integrity than it does about her desire to exploit
economic rights in her work in progress. Her words imply a mismatch between the objectives of
copyright law and her own personal interests in her work. She blogs:
“I did not want my readers to experience Midnight Sun before it was
completed, edited and published. I think it is important for everybody to
understand that what happened was a huge violation of my rights as an
author, not to mention me as a human being. As the author of the Twilight
Saga, I control the copyright and it is up to the owner of the copyright to
decide when the books should be made public; this is the same for
musicians and filmmakers. Just because someone buys a book or movie or
song, or gets a download off the Internet, doesn't mean that they own the
right to reproduce and distribute it. Unfortunately, with the Internet, it is
easy for people to obtain and share items that do not legally belong to them.
No matter how this is done, it is still dishonest. This has been a very
upsetting experience for me, but I hope it will at least leave my fans with a
better understanding of copyright and the importance of artistic control.”63
While her comments are framed in terms of copyright, the overriding concern seems to
be with the integrity of the authorial process and the honesty or dishonesty of copyright
audiences. Both of these issues are foreign to modern copyright law. Copyright law is aimed at
facilitating innovation by providing economic rewards to authors and artists to incentivize
innovation64. However, Meyer describes the unauthorized dissemination of Midnight Sun as a
violation of her rights as an author and her rights as a human being. She is speaking of personal
63

See http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun.html, last viewed on February 1, 2010.
LEAFFER, supra note ___, at 24 (4 ed, 2005) (“copyright law provides the incentive to create information
and a shelter to develop and protect it.”)
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rights to integrity of her work and autonomy in controlling her literary creation, rather than rights
to control economic benefits derived from her work. Her concern with the dishonesty or honesty
of her readers is linked not to their incursions on her economic property rights but to their
intrusions on her personal autonomy as an author and an individual.
This situation may be an example of a failure of copyright law to address the needs of
creators of artistic works, as distinct from the more commercially oriented producers and
distributors. Legal action against direct and secondary copyright infringers would be time
consuming, cost ineffective, and distracting for the unpublished author. More to the point, it
would not effectively protect the rights with which the author is most directly concerned – those
related to her own integrity as an artist and of her fans’ integrity as consumers of her work.
Furthermore, copyright law is doing nothing here to incentivize innovation. The upshot of the
Midnight Sun debacle was that the author decided not to proceed with the project because her
heart was not in it after the perceived violation of her rights. In August 2008, she suspended
work on the project indefinitely65.
One might argue that in fact copyright law could have prevented this outcome if the
author had used it appropriately. In other words, if Meyer had brought at least some legal
actions – or sent some letters of demand – to key websites posting Midnight Sun illegally, she
would have sent an effective message against copyright piracy, and might have obtained some
injunctions and maybe pecuniary damages. This may have deterred others from illegally posting
the material and might have encouraged some people who had posted the manuscript to remove
it from their websites. Thus, one could argue that there is nothing wrong with copyright law
here. The practical limitations are the time, cost and jurisdictional difficulties associated with
bringing actions against often anonymous, globally dispersed, and impecunious defendants in
online forums. This may suggest that if any revision is needed to copyright law those revisions
should be aimed at procedural difficulties with enforcing copyrights, rather than at the
substantive provisions of the law.
Nevertheless, Meyer’s focus on authorial integrity as well as on the intentions - honesty
versus dishonesty - of her fans suggest that there may be something more going on here. There
may be some important values playing out in the Web 2.0 creator-consumer culture that
copyright law is currently missing. Copyright law and policy makers could think about whether
the United States needs to adopt something akin to a broader moral rights law to better protect
authors’ personal rights, as distinct from copyrights, in their works. Moral rights protect aspects
of an authors’ work such as the authors’ right to be identified with the work (attribution right)66
and the authors’ right to have some say in the way in which the work is presented to the public
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See http://www.stepheniemeyer.com/midnightsun.html, last viewed on February 1, 2010 (“So where does
this leave Midnight Sun? My first feeling was that there was no way to continue. Writing isn't like math; in math,
two plus two always equals four no matter what your mood is like. With writing, the way you feel changes
everything. If I tried to write Midnight Sun now, in my current frame of mind, James would probably win and all the
Cullens would die, which wouldn't dovetail too well with the original story. In any case, I feel too sad about what
has happened to continue working on Midnight Sun, and so it is on hold indefinitely.”)
66
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8D.03 (“The first major moral right concerns attribution. Conceptually, it falls
into two poles - requiring use of the author's name, and forbidding that usage.”)
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(integrity right)67. Moral rights are more popular in European countries than in the angloAmerican copyright tradition68. Copyright holders often oppose moral rights because authors
who retain moral rights are in a position to impede downstream copyright holders’ abilities to
commercially exploit relevant works69.
However, the Midnight Sun incident suggests that maybe some American authors are
more concerned with the integrity of their artistic creations than with their economic rights. Of
course, it must be conceded that in the Midnight Sun example, moral rights law may not have
helped Meyer with her concerns in practice. Like copyright law, moral rights litigation suffers
from the same practical limitations as copyright – in terms of time, cost and jurisdictional issues.
Thus, it is arguable that even if an author would like a specific right to the integrity of her
creation, copyright law basically gives her all that she requires in practical terms. It may be that
emerging social norms in relation to respect for an author’s expressed preference about online
uses of her work could become a more important tool in practice to protect against violations of
authorial integrity than any form of legal regulation.
C. Case Study 2: Mashup Videos
1. The Remix Culture
While the Midnight Sun case study focuses largely on the author’s views about her right
in her creative works, the second case study focuses on the consumer-creators’ - or fans’ - views.
With Twilight, as with many other popular works of fiction, fans in the Web 2.0 universe like to
utilize aspects of copyright works and remix them for their own expressive purposes70. These
remixes can take the forms of parody or criticism, but very often are simple expressions of ways
in which fans relate to the works. Fans may want to experiment with attaching particular
musical tracks to images from movies, or they may prefer to mix movie images with their own
artwork. Fans may also want to experiment with combining aspects of different movies or
television shows to create something new71.
Much is being written in the legal literature about the extent to which these kinds of
remixes constitute copyright infringement and, if so, what kinds of defenses may be available to
67

Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity Rights, 26 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 297, 298 (2003) (“Integrity rights enable the artist to prohibit alterations to his work by subsequent
owners of the physical objects to the extent that such alterations are injurious to his honor or reputation - such
instances of manipulation of his artistic vision are as offensive as direct assaults to his person.”)
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See LEAFFER, supra note ___, at 376, n. 421, 422 (description of French moral rights law).
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Ong, supra note ___, at 305 (discussing common objections to integrity rights on the basis that they place
restrictions on what a property/copyright owner can do in terms of exploiting a protected work); LEAFFER, supra
note ___, at 387 (noting that moral rights also potentially interfere with contract rights over copyrighted works in
lucrative markets such as the motion picture industry).
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Lee, supra note ___, at 1461 (“Informal copyright practices have developed, most notably, for UGC.
Whether in blogs, fan fiction, videos, music, or other mashups, many users freely use the copyrighted works of
others without prior permission and even beyond our conventional understandings of fair use.”)
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See, for example, http://www.bing.com/videos/watch/video/buffy-vs-edward-twilight-remixed-originalversion/7A42AE7D5299962DA2667A42AE7D5299962DA266, viewed on January 20, 2010 (mashup of scenes
from Buffy, the Vampire Slayer and Twilight retelling the narrative as if Buffy has met and fallen in love with
Edward Cullen from Twilight.)
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the remixers in certain contexts72. The fair use and implied license defenses from copyright law
take on particular significance in the remix context. What is interesting about this case study is
the gap between what the law actually says and what the remixers think it says, or should say.
Members of the Web 2.0 consumer-creator culture who develop remixes often attach labels to
their work stating either that the work does not infringe copyright or is fair use of the
copyrighted material73, or that no copyright infringement was intended74.
With respect to the assertion that a particular remix does not infringe copyright or is a fair
use, that statement does not make much sense under American copyright law. Because of the
vague, equitable rule of reason approach to fair use in American law75, a determination of fair
use cannot be definitively made until a case is litigated. No one can affirmatively state ex ante
that their use of a given work is a fair use with any certainty76. These statements by consumercreators might be taken to mean that they did not intend to infringe copyright and that they
assume that their creation is a fair use. However, the mere assertion that a particular use is a fair
use does not automatically make it so.
Likewise, the remixer’s stated intention not to infringe copyright is irrelevant to a
determination of copyright liability. Consumer-creators who state that they did not intend to
infringe copyright, and make no particular assertion about fair use are perhaps being more
realistic in that they are saying nothing about whether their use does in fact infringe copyright.
However, the statement is not particularly meaningful as a matter of copyright law because
intention is irrelevant to a claim for direct copyright infringement77. There may be various
explanations as to why remixers attach these statements to their work. They might honestly
think that their intentions are relevant to a copyright claim. They might additionally think,
72

See, for example, Lee, supra note ___.
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equally erroneously, that a remix is a fair use under copyright law. On the other hand, they may
suspect that they are in fact infringing copyright, but that stating their intentions not to do so
might temper the response of copyright holders. In other words, a copyright holder who sees that
the remixer was not intending to infringe copyright might decide to stop with a letter of demand
rather than proceeding to litigation.
To the extent that consumer-creators have erroneous notions of what fair use is and how
copyright liability works, maybe public education is the answer. However, that begs the
question whether copyright law should regulate fans’ remixes in the first place, particularly those
that are noncommercial in nature and do not likely interfere with the copyright holder’s
economic rights. In fact, these remixes might enhance the value of copyrighted works by
increasing online discourse about them, and therefore increasing general interest in the works.
The remixes and associated online discourse keep the works in the public eye and in the public
mind, perhaps making it more likely that people will go and see a film or rent/stream a video for
a second time, or purchase an associated product like a soundtrack, wall calendar, or other
merchandise associated with the work.
Some copyright holders have taken advantage of opportunities to allow fans to utilize
their works online subject to certain conditions of use. With respect to the Star Wars franchise,
for example, George Lucas’ company, Lucasfilm, has allowed fan mashups and fan fiction
relating to his work – and has even provided unique content to fans creating such works provided that his company takes ownership of the resulting works78. This may suit some fans
who only intend to use the works for expressive purposes and have no commercial motivations.
Joss Whedon is another example of a creator who encourages his fans to create works related to
his own material. When he produced Dr Horrible’s Singalong Blog79, he actively encouraged
fans to film their own videos related to the storyline. He then incorporated a selection of those
videos on the DVD release of the short movie80.
2. Remixing and Fair Use
Regardless of what fans want, or what they say they want, the law has its own limitations
with respect to video mashups and fan fiction. In today’s cut and paste culture, presumably a
prima facie copyright infringement is relatively easy to establish in cases where clips of music,
78

HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE, 156-157 (2006) (“In
2000, Lucasfilm offered Star Wars fans free Web space (www.starwars.com) and unique content for their sites, but
only under the condition that whatever they created would become the studio’s intellectual property.”)
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See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1227926/, last viewed on February 1, 2010.
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See http://www.amazon.com/Horribles-Sing-Along-Blog-PatrickHarris/dp/B001M5UDGS/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1265043525&sr=8-1, last viewed on February 1, 2010
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League of Evil.”)(emphasis added). A number of fan videos are also available at: http://www.wonderflonium.com/,
last viewed on February 1, 2010.
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video or text have been taken directly from an original source and inserted into a new consumer
creation. Copying does not get much more direct than this. However, applicable defenses are
not such an easy question. Whatever fans think they know about the fair use defense, for
example, judicial applications of the defense to the mashup video context would likely not lead
to many clear cut answers.
The fair use defense, as currently set out in § 107 of the copyright act provides in relevant
part that:
“the fair use of a copyrighted work … for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.”
This defense is not intended to create a clear rule delineating precisely when a particular
use of a copyrighted work will be excused from liability. Rather, it is intended to operate as an
equitable rule of reason, as the defense operated at common law prior to its incorporation into the
1976 copyright act81. Thus, courts apply the various elements of the defense with flexibility and
discretion. Application of some elements of the defense to the fan video mashup context would
be relatively easy. For example, it would be difficult for a fan to argue that a mashup was
created for any of the purposes listed in the first paragraph of the defense: that is, criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. Of course, these are not exclusive
fair use categories. Other uses may be considered fair uses outside this list.
In some cases, a mashup might actually count as criticism or comment depending on the
nature of the mashup. Some video mashups might include critiques of the works on which they
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are based82. Moviegoers are increasingly making their own online video reviews of new movies,
including clips from the movies themselves. This kind of mashup might be regarded as a
criticism or comment under the fair use defense. It is also possible that a mashup that provides a
particular artistic take on the work on which it is based could be regarded as commenting on that
work for the purpose of the fair use defense. For example, one might put together a montage of
female vampires from the Twilight movies attacking other vampires, and perhaps mix it with
examples of Buffy from Buffy, the Vampire Slayer also attacking vampires, and then accompany
the video with a music track like “Sisters are Doing it For Themselves.” This might be regarded
as a feminist comment or critique on the source material. On the other hand, it may simply be
regarded as a general comment on feminism or “girl power” rather than a specific comment on
the underlying works sampled in the mashup.
Assuming that a particular mashup either falls within the comment or criticism area, or
that a court finds the mashup to be otherwise generally within the scope of a potential fair use
defense, the court then has to apply the four factor test for fair use. With respect to the first
factor, mashup videos shared over online services such as YouTube and Facebook are generally
not being used for commercial purposes, nor are they for nonprofit educational purposes. Thus
the second prong of the first factor is largely irrelevant in the mashup context. However, the first
limb of the first factor has often been judicially characterized as embodying the concept of a
transformative use of a protected work83. This judicial gloss on the words of the statute has been
developed from the underlying policy determination that copyright law is supposed to be about
encouraging innovation and enhancing the store of information and ideas within society84. Some
judges have opined that purely consumptive uses of copyright works should be given less
deference under the fair use defense than uses that transform the work in some way85. The
rationale is that transformative activities contribute to artistic innovation in a way that purely
consumptive activities do not86.
If transformative use is an important aspect of the first fair use factor, then a court would
have to look at each case of a mashup video to ascertain how transformative the particular
mashup might be. Some remixes of copyrighted works are likely to be extremely transformative:
for example, a video remix that aggregates elements from different copyright works to create a
new work with a new message. This is similar to the case of rap music that routinely aggregates
snippets of earlier compositions to make something new. In fact, these kinds of transformative
82
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remixes have been very common throughout the history of music87. They are also becoming
more common in other fields online.
Mashup maps, for example, are a recent online trend, and various services have been
established combining the works of Google Maps with other information – such as property
listings, and locations of crimes88. While many of these uses probably do technically infringe
copyrights held by Google in their maps – or at least in their mapping software – norms have
developed under which Google welcomes these uses rather than attacks them. This is because
Google ultimately obtains more good publicity and potentially more advertising revenue from
allowing these kinds of uses of its works. Google also allows other entities freely to embed its
maps in their online applications, which again is a good source of advertising for Google89.
An online video mashup review of a movie, book, or television show, incorporating clips
from the copyrighted work may meet the criterion of being a transformative use, as well as
presumably being criticism or comment under § 107’s preamble to the fair use factors. Thus,
while many mashups while not be for nonprofit educational purposes as contemplated in fair use
factor one, they will nevertheless likely satisfy the “transformative use” requirements often
incorporated by courts into applications of the first fair use factor. Therefore, the first fair use
factor in fan mashup cases will tend to cut in favor of the defendant consumer-creator90.
The second fair use factor – relating to the nature of the copyrighted work – will
generally cut in favor of the copyright holder in cases involving mashups of popular movies and
other artistic works. The most common subjects of fan mashups are movies, television shows,
and music videos. These are the typical creative works that lie at the heart of copyright
protection. They may be contrasted with, say, newspapers, non-fiction works, computer
software, and databases, all of which are less central to copyright’s predominant aims of
promoting artistic innovation91.
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The third fair use factor - the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole – may cut either way depending on the specific mashup video.
The amount and substantiality criterion can be applied quantitatively or qualitatively92, so the
fact that a consumer-creator only made a four minute re-mix will not help her case if what she
has taken from the original work is deemed to be qualitatively substantial. If a remixer uses, say,
a key scene from a movie, or an entire song from a movie, that may be regarded as a substantial
taking for the purposes of the third fair use factor.
The application of the fourth fair use factor - the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work – may well cut in favor of the consumer-creators in
many cases. Remixes are unlikely to negatively impact the copyright holder’s current or future
markets. They may, in fact, create some positive market effects93. It is unlikely that mashup
videos could ever serve as a market substitute for the movies or other media on which they are
based94. Thus, consumer-creators are unlikely to negatively affect a copyright holder’s market
by way of substituting its product for that of the copyright holder. At the same time, one might
argue that the existence of free online movie mashups affect the copyright holder’s market
positively because they generate more interest in the original work. They are arguably a form of
free advertising that should be welcomed by the copyright holders.
Copyright holders might argue that some mashups affect their markets in a negative way.
For example, a particularly scathing video mashup review of a movie may deter people from
going to see the movie or from renting, streaming, or buying the DVD of the movie. However,
this is not generally the kind of effect on the market at which the fourth fair use factor is aimed.
The fair use defense is supposed to be copyright law’s attempt to balance free speech against
proprietary copyrights95. Thus, one would hope that a video mashup movie review is treated
much as a review in a newspaper or in any other news media. Such reviews are typically
excused as a fair use to the extent they copy material directly from the work being reviewed.
At the end of the day, factors one and four in most video mashup cases are likely to cut in
favor of the consumer-creator, while factor two will generally cut in favor of the copyright
holder. The third factor – amount and substantiality of the portion of the copyright work used –
will depend on the context of a given case. If the fair use defense was routinely applied using a
simple mathematical formula, it might be possible to say that most fair use cases will work out in
favor of the consumer-creators. This is because two factors will generally fall in their favor96,

92

id, at § 13.05[A][3] (“The proper analysis [under the third fair use factor] includes a determination of not
just quantitative, but also qualitative substantiality. Thus, it is too much to quote "what was essentially the heart of
the book" even if it only amounts to verbatim copying of 300 words out of 200,000 words in plaintiffs work, or a
few key pages out of 20,000 total, or one minute and fifteen seconds from plaintiffs' one hour and twelve minute
motion picture. On the other hand, it has been held fair to copy a whole magazine cover as part of comparative
advertising.”)
93
Hetcher, supra note ___, at 1883-4 (noting that fan originated remixes generally will not cause any
economic harm to a copyright holder and may, in fact, bring benefits).
94
id.
95
David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U PA L REV 673 (2000)
(exploring the delicate balance between copyrights and First Amendment guarantees).
96
ie Factors 1 and 4 (purpose and character of the use, effect of the use on the market)

Copyrighting “Twilight”

21

one will fall against them97, and one will vary from case to case98. However, this is not how the
defense is applied in practice. A court may give particular weight to, say, factor two if it is
particularly interested in preserving incentives to innovate in areas that go to the heart of
copyright protection.
In summary, the fair use defense may prove problematic for remixers99. The fact that the
creators of video mashups assert fair use and say that their work is not infringement does not
automatically make it so. Of course, it is a time consuming and costly proposition for copyright
holders to bring – or even to threaten – judicial proceedings against remixers. Additionally,
copyright holders may be happy to allow a certain amount of online remixing of their work
because of the potential financial benefits these activities could bring as free advertising. This
has certainly proved to be the case with respect to remixes of online properties such as Google
Maps100. Perhaps these new online norms might tell us something about how copyright law
should work in the Web 2.0 age with respect to uses of works that are not specifically authorized
by copyright holders, but may be beneficial to them.
3. Remix Liability and Internet Intermediaries
Copyright holders who object to remixing and who do not want to bring actions against
individual remixers may, of course, decide to take action against services that host mashup
videos, such as YouTube and Google Video. Depending on the way the relevant web service is
set up, there would be some question as to whether these services might be direct infringers, or
could only be secondarily liable for direct infringements of others. For example, where a search
engine like Google only links to content on other websites and does not reproduce the content
itself, the chances are that it would only be exposed to secondary liability claims, and not to
claims for direct copyright infringement101. Current precedents on secondary liability are not
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terribly clear102, and they do rely on the establishment of primary liability somewhere else.
Thus, to succeed in a claim for contributory or vicarious liability against a search engine like
Google, a copyright holder would still have to convince a court that the remixers whose work is
indexed by Google are infringing copyrights in the first place.
Direct infringement might be easier to establish in the case of a video hosting service like
YouTube or Facebook. These services do host content on their own servers that has been posted
by their users. Generally, their terms of service attempt to contract out of copyright liability by
extracting contractual warranties from users that nothing will be posted in breach of copyright103.
Of course, remix artists who assert fair use will feel that they have satisfied these terms. In fact,
one reason that many remixers put “no copyright infringement” notices on their work might be to
convince themselves and the online service providers that they are not in breach of the web
host’s terms of use.
In any event, most popular online services that host others’ content are quick to respond
to copyright takedown notices they receive from copyright holders, and will leave it to the poster
of the alleged infringing work subsequently to establish fair use104. The copyright act has been
amended in the digital age to create a safe harbor for Internet intermediaries who respond
quickly to such notices105. Thus, the law effectively leans towards the protection of copyright
holders, and puts a lot of power in the hands of those who own copyrights to decide the fate of
mashups involving their work. Even where there is some question about whether a given
mashup might be a fair use, the ability of the web hosting service to avail itself of the safe harbor
on receipt of a takedown notice will likely encourage the web host to err on the side of caution
and remove the posting. Thus, web services like YouTube might remove much material that is
not infringing copyright. It may be difficult for the initial poster to establish fair use in the
absence of litigation determining that the use is, indeed, excusable under § 107. This is a high
cost burden for an individual remixer to bear.
The current availability of mashups online might suggest that many copyright holders are
not too worried about remixing. This apparent lack of concern may be because copyright holders
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do not want to aggravate their fan bases. Additionally, copyright holders may be happy for
remixing activities to generate additional interest in their works. The availability of remixes
online therefore depends in large measure on the attitudes of copyright holders. The singer,
Prince, for example, is very quick to assert copyright ownership with respect to mashup videos
posted online106, while the owners of copyrights in the Twilight franchise do not seem so
concerned – at least judging by the number of Twilight related mashups currently available on
YouTube.
This result may be as it should be. If we assume that copyright holders should have the
right to decide what is done with their work online, then the fact that some copyright holders
allow remixing and others do not is not a problem. However, if we assume that the majority of
remixing does not in fact infringe copyright – or at least may be excused in many cases under the
fair use defense – there is a potential problem. The copyright holders are arguably taking too
much control in situations where they effectively dictate what web hosting services like
YouTube do with mashup videos. Given that YouTube, Facebook, MySpace and other OSNs
want to avoid copyright liability, they will err on the side of responding to takedown notices
received from copyright holders, to the detriment of fans engaging in remixing activities.
There may be a number of solutions to this potential problem. Free market advocates
would favor a solution that allows the market to sort itself out without regulatory intervention.
This is happening in other Web 2.0 scenarios involving online copyrights – such as mashups of
Google maps with other services107. Commentators are increasingly arguing that smart
businesses in the Web 2.0 age will open themselves up to online interactions with their consumer
bases and will let consumers participate in online business activities108. While much of this
literature has been about businesses focused more on traditional goods and services109, there is
no reason why the same reasoning could not be applied to arts and entertainment businesses.
Indeed, Joss Whedon’s general receptiveness to involving his fan base in the development of his
works is a good example of this theory in action in the entertainment context110.
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For those who prefer regulatory solutions, it may be worth revisiting the application of
certain aspects of the copyright act to the mashup video context. The two most salient provisions
of the act implicated in this context are the fair use defense and the safe harbor provisions for
online service providers. With respect to the fair use defense, it seems that one of the key
challenges raised by mashup videos is that it is unclear whether, and to what extent, particular
mashup videos would qualify as fair uses of copyright material. The answer to this question is
also very relevant to questions about the safe harbor for Internet service providers, because if
there is a clearer answer to the fair use question, web hosts have greater guidance as to whether a
copyright infringement notice relating to a mashup is reasonable or not.
As noted in the preceding discussion, the biggest disadvantage for those consumercreators asserting fair use in their mashup videos is that a determination of fair use cannot be
made until a court determines a given issue. The ability of a remixer – and her web- hosting
service provider – to have a better ex ante idea of fair use would be very helpful in practice.
Obviously, the mere assertion by the mashup artist of a fair use defense is not enough. Some
third party guidelines would be very useful here. Some commentators have suggested
approaches to copyright law that take an ex ante approach to fair use111. This would be a useful
step forward particularly in the video mashup context. Alternatively, the issuance of some
guidelines by, say, the Copyright Office, or some other expert agency on fair use in the mashup
context would be very helpful112. That way, remixers could say more than “no copyright
intended.” They could, in fact, assert fair use and reference an authoritative or at least persuasive
guideline to support their claim.
4. Remixing and Implied Licenses
Outside of the fair use defense, some remixers might try and refute claims of copyright
infringement by relying on an implied license from the copyright holder. While most video
mashups that include copyrighted material tend to say either “no copyright infringement
intended” or to assert fair use, few refer explicitly to a license. This may be because an implied
license defense would be difficult to sustain in cases where a consumer-creator has taken
material from a source work that includes clear coypright notices: for example, a movie or DVD
that starts with a copyright notice, including descriptions of penalties for copyright infringement.
However, in cases where what is remixed is taken from other sources – like promotional
websites for movies that incorporate publicity stills – an implied license defense may be
available.
In Summit Entertainment v Beckett Media113, an unauthorized Twilight fan magazine was
unsuccessful in its assertion of an implied license defense against the movie studio holding
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copyright in the Twilight movies. However, the defendant’s lack of success was attributable to
the fact that it exceeded the scope of a license with respect to the publicity stills. The defendant
had displayed altered versions of the images with knowledge that the movie studio’s publicity
website clearly stated that users of the stills “will not edit, alter or modify any of the Content
without Summit’s prior written approval”114. The defendant fan magazine had also used
photographs that were not available on Summit’s publicity website. Thus, if a mashup video
artist only used publicity stills that were freely available under an express or implied license and
did not extend or alter images in breach of license terms, she might successfully defend against a
copyright infringement action on this basis.
This might be a useful lesson for remixers to learn – where to find content that they are
allowed to use. Movie studios and other copyright holders might also like to think further about
which content – and how much content – they make available under open license terms.
Copyright holders may not want their audiences to sample indiscriminately from their complete
works, but they may decide to make more material available for public use than is currently the
case. For example, clips from movie trailers – as distinct from movie clips not appearing in the
trailers – might be an obvious example of material that copyright holders could make available
for public use. Many Twilight mashup videos do, in fact, sample from the movie trailers. A
number of mashups are actually attempts at fan made trailers. In other words, the fans are
showing the copyright holders what they think the trailers should look like. This may be useful
information for the copyright holders in terms of marketing appropriately to their likely
audience.
In particular, fans often make mashup trailers for movies that have not yet been made or
released. For example, if one searches for “video clip Twilight Eclipse” on Google Video or
YouTube, one can find a variety of fan made trailers for the third Twilight movie, Eclipse. This
movie has been filmed but not yet released. The fan made trailers use material from the previous
films and music that they think is appropriate to the story to suggest ways in which they think the
third movie should be marketed. This may be useful information for savvy copyright holders.
They might learn from their fans the best and most effective ways to develop trailers to attract
the interest of their potential audiences. In the future, some copyright holders might release
video footage and music tracks from forthcoming films and create competitions for fans to
develop trailers for the forthcoming movie before the studio develops its own trailer. Many fans
would be delighted to have this opportunity and would not require any compensation for doing
so. Thus, movie studios could potentially save money on marketing by simply turning to their
fan base and asking for help in promoting their forthcoming works.
D. Case Study 3: New Moon Video Clip and the Criminal Aspects of Copyright Law
In November of 2009, a twenty-two year old woman, Samantha Tumpach, was arrested
in a Chicago movie theater for incidentally videotaping three minutes of footage of the newly
released film in the Twilight saga, New Moon115. She recorded the snippets of the movie while
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filming her sister’s birthday party, during the course of which the party-goers went to see the
movie. The theater management notified the on-site police officer of the taping in compliance
with the anti-piracy guidelines issues to movie theaters by the Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA)116. Tumpach was detained and ultimately spent two days in jail before being
released and having the charges against her dropped. Prior to her release, she potentially faced a
three year jail term, and was by all accounts traumatized by the incident117.
While the director of New Moon, Chris Weitz, questioned whether the arrest was
justified118, there was little he could do about it. He did not hold copyright in the film. He was
quoted as saying: “There is, needless to say, a difference between trying to protect the copyright
of a film and making an unfair example of someone who clearly seems not to have any intentions
towards video piracy”119. However, the criminal law of copyright, bolstered by the zero
tolerance policy adopted by the MPAA120, left little room for discretion in enforcement. Even if
Tumpach had wanted to engage in video piracy, the video was not of sufficient length or quality
to do so. The audio track was obscured by her talking throughout the three minutes of film121.
The actual copyright holder, Summit Entertainment, was in a difficult position. Summit
is a relatively new movie studio that has only recently gone into the business of making and
marketing its own films122. The Twilight Saga has been its first big success story. On the one
hand, the studio owes much of its recent success to its fans – suggesting that it may not want to
see them jailed on charges of criminal copyright infringement. On the other hand, it has to take a
stand against digital copyright piracy or it puts its own commercial future at risk. Summit’s
official statement appeared to be an attempt to tread the very fine line between taking a stand
against video piracy and not alienating its fan base:
“In regards to the situation with Samantha Tumpach, we applaud Muvico [the
movie theater] for upholding the zero tolerance policy on piracy …. The pirating
of films is a very serious issue and we all need to remain vigilant to protect the art
of film and the myriad of businesses that the film industry supports. We believe
that the attention that this incident has drawn, has served as a reminder to us all
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that any form of film piracy, or perceived piracy, will be treated with the utmost
seriousness.
Summit is pleased that all charges against Ms. Tumpach have been dropped and
appreciate the efforts of the police and the prosecutors in this outcome.”123
Summit is “pleased” that the charges were dropped, but makes no apologies for the initial
arrest, nor for taking no apparent public action to set the matter straight. In fact, Summit
reserves its praise for the actions of the police and prosecutors. In other words, it looks like
Summit is saying that it wants to take a “hands off” approach to these matters, leaving resolution
to the criminal justice system. One could argue that copyright holders should take a more active
role in these situations, particularly where, as here, some of their key creative personnel – such
as a movie director – are speaking out against a given police action.
While Tumpach’s video was never intended to be publicly distributed, the story
surrounding her arrest and release were very quickly and publicly disseminated over the
blogosphere. Web 2.0 technologies that enable the public to comment on these kinds of
situations might be of concern to copyright holders, particularly those who want to maintain
good relations with their customers. Presumably, Tumpach’s arrest will not prevent die-hard
Twilight fans – often referred to as Twihards124 - from watching Twilight films and buying the
DVDs and soundtracks. However, some of them may think twice about seeing other films
produced by Summit.
The executives at Summit may have engaged in a cost-benefits analysis and realized that
they probably would not lose much, if any, audience share by supporting the zero-tolerance
policy in this instance. It was therefore likely more important to them to support the MPAA’s
stance against copyright piracy than to protect one fan who was careless enough to record in a
movie theater despite posted signs warning against recording in the theaters. Maybe the outcome
here is as it should be, if one takes the view that theater patrons are clearly notified that recording
movies is an offense and will be penalized. On the other hand, perhaps a reasonable theater
patron could interpret those warnings as prohibiting recording entire films, as opposed to random
– and commercially unusable - snippets. Similar interpretative uncertainties seem to be arising
here as with interpretation of the fair use defense in the video mashup context125. As there is no
clear ex ante guidance as to whether a particular mashup will be fair use or not, there is arguably
also no clear guidance as to when a recording in a movie theater is sufficiently de minimus not to
attract criminal copyright liability.
Perhaps copyright distributors and movie theaters should be required to make their
warnings against recording in theaters more clear than they currently are. Alternatively, police
could be given more discretion about when to detain a person for recording snippets, but this
would also require clearer – or at least different – guidelines than currently exist. Perhaps in
cases like the Tumpach scenario, police could be given the clear discretion, supported by an
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MPAA statement, to confiscate the physical recording – or perhaps even the recording device but to excuse the individual who made the recording.
E. Case Study 4: robsessedpattinson.com Bloggers versus Robsessed DVD Producers
The consumer reviews section on Amazon.com for a documentary entitled Robsessed about actor Robert Pattinson who plays Edward Cullen in Twilight – contains some interesting
data. Amazon’s consumer reviews incorporate feedback from customers about products and
services available on Amazon. Amazon encourages customers to rate their past purchases from
one to five, one being the lowest and five being the highest recommendation for a product. A
summary of customer rankings is presented in a bar graph on Amazon’s webpage for the item,
accompanied by a series of full text customer reviews. Each product’s bar graph generally
conforms with one of two basic configurations. Either customers agree on the ranking, so the
ranking clusters around one or two consecutive numbers, or the rankings come out more in the
shape of a curve representing a small number of responses from people who like the product the
least, a majority of responses clumped in the middle, and a small number of rankings on the high
end from people who really love the product.
A generally popular product may receive rankings purely in the 4-5 range, while the
rankings for an unpopular product may clump around the 1-2 range. For products with split
consumer support, there may be a wider smattering of rankings, say, all the way between 1 and
5, but with a majority of the rankings somewhere in the middle – around 2 or 3. By way of
example, the customer rankings for Dan Brown’s most recent novel, The Lost Symbol, were
relatively evenly spread. Amazon’s consumer review section for the book, including the bar
graph, is reproduced in Table 1.
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Table 1: Amazon Customer Reviews for The Lost Symbol, as of January 21, 2010126

Similarly, Amazon’s customer rankings for the boxed set of Twilight books is set out in
Table 2. Unlike The Lost Symbol, the rankings here are clustered around 5, indicating the high
popularity of the series.
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Table 2: Amazon Customer Reviews for the boxed set of Twilight novels, as of
January 21, 2010127

These examples demonstrate how customer reviews tend to either spread or cluster.
What was interesting about the reviews for the Robsessed DVD is that they did not follow either
pattern. The reviews comprised a large group of fives, nothing in the middle, and then a large
group of ones. Amazon’s consumer review section for the DVD is set out in Table 3.
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Table 3: Amazon Customer Reviews for the Robsessed DVD, as of January 21,
2010128

A quick look at the first few customer comments below the graph in Table 3 provides an
indication of why the graph looks like this. It is apparent from the reviews that the producer of
the DVD, Revolver Entertainment, had taken a lot of material from others, including taking work
from fan sites and copying it with no permission or attribution. The people who ranked the video
highly presumably knew nothing of the copying allegations (or didn’t care about them), while
those who were knowledgeable about Revolver’s activities were extremely upset and ranked the
product accordingly.
One of the key blogs from which Revolver copied material was an unauthorized Robert
Pattinson fansite, robsessedpattinson.com129. The bloggers on this website were upset when
Revolver Entertainment cut and pasted material verbatim from their website to advertise the
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DVD on its own website. Revolver gave no attribution to the bloggers. The bloggers sent a
home-grown cease and desist letter to Revolver. Revolver later removed the offending material
from its website, with no express acknowledgment that it had received the letter130.
This episode is illuminating on a number of fronts. For one thing, it is an example of a
small group of bloggers bringing a complaint against a commercial production company. More
typically, copyright actions have historically involved the opposite dynamics – a commercial
enterprise proceeding against individuals who have copied its work without permission. This
example illustrates that fact that when Web 2.0 technologies empower consumers to become
creators, those consumer-creators seek to protect their own creations just as surely as commercial
producers of valuable copyrighted works do.
Another notable aspect to this scenario was the fact that, unlike deep pocketed
commercial copyright holders with their own teams of legal advisors, the bloggers had to make
do with their own understandings of the law. Their initial description of what happened, still
available on their website, does not mention copyright infringement at all, despite the fact that, to
an intellectual property lawyer, copyright infringement was clearly what was going on here. The
bloggers describe Revolver’s conduct in terms of plagiarism131 – which of course is also an
accurate description of their conduct, but generally not one that gives rise to a legal remedy132.
The bloggers also describe plagiarism as a crime which, at least in legal terms, it is not133.
Another of the bloggers’ stated concerns was the desire to protect their idol, Robert
Pattinson, from unauthorized commercial exploitation. On their blog, they note that: “Our stand
on the DVD is still the same. It's unauthorized, Robert Pattinson is not getting a dime from it and
they [Revolver Entertainment] managed to anger us, the fan base by stealing”134. The bloggers
clearly drew a distinction between their own activities and those of the makers of the
unauthorized DVD. They see nothing wrong with their own online activities – non profit public
discourse about Pattinson including text, photos and videos. However, they draw the line at
unauthorized commercial exploitation.
There are some interesting parallels between the bloggers’ conception of their legal rights
and what the law actually says. There are also some interesting points of divergence between the
two. This is therefore a useful case study to illustrate the extent to which current online social
norms align with intellectual property law and whether we can learn anything about future
directions for the law based on the norms, or vice versa. With respect to the bloggers’ complaint
about plagiarism, maybe the fact that participants in the blogosphere do not understand the
difference between plagiarism and copyright does not matter in practice. In this instance,
Revolver ultimately changed its website faced with the cease and desist letter. Whether a letter
of complaint is framed in terms of plagiarism or copyright infringement may be irrelevant if it
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results in the desired action from the complaining party’s point of view. On the other hand,
some of the comments on the blog might lead a lawyer to wonder whether someone should be
doing a better job of educating the public about copyright law, particularly now that members of
the public are increasingly becoming creators themselves in Web 2.0 forums.
One particular statement on the robsessedpattinson.com blog might be a good example of
where public education could be helpful: “Plagiarism is an awful crime and we should always
stick together to fight it.”135 While plagiarism is obviously dishonest, it is not a crime136. There
is also little guidance as to how we can “stick together” to fight it. Maybe if the law was easier
to understand and if consumer-creators had a better sense of where they might obtain legal
assistance, the copyright system would create fairer results. Blogs themselves could actually be
a great source of such public education if people with the relevant information were blogging
more about these issues.
For example, the author of this article posted on an intellectual property law blog about
the Robsessed scenario137. One of the bloggers from the fansite saw the entry and entered into an
online discussion about her legal rights138. This may be an example of the way in which Web 2.0
technologies enable norms and laws to interact. If lawyers and non-lawyers blog together about
legal issues, the non-lawyers obtain a better understanding of their legal rights and the lawyers
learn more about emerging online norms. Of course none of this goes directly to the official law
and policy makers – Congress and the judiciary – unless they are also trolling the blogosphere
for information, or are encouraging their aides and judicial clerks to do so.
Interestingly, it did not seem to have dawned on the robsessedpattinson.com bloggers that
they might have a common law trademark corresponding with their domain name and that
Revolver entertainment may have infringed or diluted the mark. If the bloggers had wanted to
bring a trademark-related action against Revolver, they may have succeeded in obtaining an
injunction against distribution of the DVD. This does not appear to be what the bloggers wanted.
They seemed happy with simply having their own text removed from Revolver’s website.
However, that may be because they did not realize the full extent of their legal rights.
Of course, a trademark action may be difficult to maintain in the case of an unregistered
mark where the mark has not been associated with a commercial product or service. If blogs are
seen as predominantly noncommercial speech forums, it might be difficult to establish an
unregistered mark in a relevant domain name. However, one might take the view that the
bloggers are providing an information service to fans of Robert Pattinson. There is some
authority in the trademark law context – mainly in the case of Internet domain name disputes –
that anything that happens on the Internet can be described as sufficiently “in commerce” for the
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purposes of trademark infringement and dilution139. Admittedly, these judicial comments are
largely aimed at determining whether a defendant’s activities are sufficiently in commerce for
trademark purposes, rather than whether the plaintiff’s use of a mark is operating as a
commercial source identifier140. Nevertheless, the notion that anything happening on the Internet
is automatically “in commerce” might have broader application.
If “robsessedpattinson.com” operates as a trademark, it is possible that the use of a
substantially similar phrase, Robsessed, as the title for a commercial DVD comprises trademark
infringement or dilution by blurring141. A trademark infringement action might be successful in
these circumstances because it is hinged on the defendant confusing consumers as to the source
or origin of a particular product or service142. As the Robsessed movie title bears a striking
similarity to the “robsessedpattinson.com” domain name, and the DVD is aimed at a very similar
market to the fan website – that is, fans of Robert Pattinson – Revolver Entertainment might well
be liable for trademark infringement. Consumer confusion is not a necessary element of a
trademark dilution action143 Thus, if the bloggers had a trademark in their domain name, they
would not need to establish confusion to mount a dilution action, although they would have to
assert that their trademark was sufficiently “famous” as required by the dilution statute144. This
may be difficult for a fan website in practice.
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III. Copyright Lessons from the Vampire Blogosphere
While the case studies presented here comprise a somewhat eclectic mix of scenarios
involving intellectual property rights in the Web 2.0 generation, it is possible to extrapolate some
general trends relating to copyright law and policy in the Web 2.0 context. The case studies also
nicely illustrate some of the emerging interactions between online norms, copyright laws, and to
some extent market forces145. Importantly, these case studies shed some light on the attitudes of
those who are often under-represented in intellectual property policy debates - notably individual
authors, and their consumer-creator fan bases. At least three significant points can be drawn
from the case studies that would be useful areas for future debate and development in copyright
law and policy. They comprise: (a) the relevance of intention to Web 2.0 copyright law and
enforcement policies; (b) the varying perspectives on copyright protections of different
stakeholders including original authors and their fans; and, (c) the problematic application of the
fair use doctrine within the Web 2.0 remix culture. Each of these issues is discussed in some
detail in the following sections.
A. The Role of Intention in Copyright Infringement
The second and third case studies are good illustrations of the relevance of intention
within the Web 2.0 copyright context. The second case study focused on fan mashups of
copyrighted works, while the third involved criminal infringement of copyright with respect to
snippets of a film incidentally recorded at a birthday party. In each case, there is an apparent
mismatch between how potential copyright infringers think that the law works – or should work
– and how the law actually works. The fans creating mashup videos and the young woman
taking the video in the movie theater felt that their intentions not to infringe copyright should
count for something146. However, the strict liability basis of copyright law does not take account
of intention.
We might draw two distinct conclusions about the relevance of intention in copyright
policy. The first conclusion is that copyright infringers are simply ignorant of copyright law and
need to be better educated so they know that copyright infringement involves strict liability. The
second possible conclusion is that there is something wrong with current copyright law and
policy. Under this second view, the law is not sufficiently tailored to the realities of consumer
uses of works involving modern digital technologies. While strict liability may have made sense
in previous times when technology was less sophisticated, it arguably now causes harm to
society’s ability to express itself using these new more interactive technologies. In this sense,
copyright could be working counter to its underlying aims of encouraging innovation and artistic
expression147.
There is some merit to the first conclusion – that copyright policy works just fine and
consumer-creators need to be better educated. This policy has developed over the years to
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protect copyright holders against unauthorized uses of their works for good reason. On this
view, consumer-creators need to be aware not only that copyright infringement involves strict
liability, but they also need to be better educated as to how to mount effective defenses to
infringement claims. And there’s the rub. As noted previously, the most obvious defense for
copyright infringement in the consumer-creator context is fair use. The contours of the defense
are simply too vague for consumers to know with any degree of certainty whether their activities
– mashup videos, private recordings, fan fiction - comprise fair use in any given case.
Additionally, there is little ex ante guidance as to whether a particular use will be regarded as a
fair use. Thus, potential infringers would need to be prepared to defend against a copyright
infringement action to establish their defense. In this sense, a consumer-creator will always be
on the defensive. There is no affirmative action an individual can take to establish a fair use. A
mere assertion on a YouTube video that the video is a fair use or that no copyright infringement
was intended will not be determinative of fair use.
Another wrinkle to relying on the first conclusion – that copyright policy is fine as it is –
is that when criminal cases are considered alongside civil actions, the law becomes even more
confusing. It is currently unclear whether intent is an aspect of criminal copyright law. Nimmer
has noted that American courts have generally required proof of intent or willfulness to be
established by the prosecution on the part of the alleged infringer in a criminal copyright case148.
However, it is unclear whether this means intent to copy or intent to infringe149. When applied to
a situation like the third case study – involving potential criminal action for incidental
videotaping of a snippet of a film – it is not clear how an intent inquiry might play out.
Tumpach, the potential criminal defendant, probably did not intend to infringe copyright law, but
she may have intended to copy snippets of the movie, particularly if intent is interpreted as
incorporating consciously pointing a video camera in the general direction of a movie screen and
pressing the “record” button.
Where intention is perhaps more relevant in the criminal context is the requirement,
clearly downplayed or overlooked by the police in the Tumpach situation, that the defendant acts
with a commercial profit motive150. In this respect, the Tumpach case study evidences the need
for better education of those enforcing criminal copyright law, rather than better education of
copyright consumers. If commercial profit motive is a requirement of a criminal copyright
prosecution, then Tumpach should never have been detained, given that three minutes of film
footage with her own voice obscuring the audio track could clearly never be the basis of a
commercial profit enterprise.
In sum, the difficulties inherent in accepting that copyright should always attract strict
liability is the amount of uncertainty this view generates in practice. It leaves consumers
struggling with confusing issues as to the availability of the fair use defense. It also leaves those
enforcing copyrights in the criminal sphere struggling with the extent to which criminal liability
should differ from civil liability in terms of intent, if at all. If intent were to become an aspect of
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copyright law, then some of these problems may be alleviated. Adopting an intent requirement
in copyright law would also better meet the realities of Web 2.0 society as evidenced by online
discussions, including comments by original authors, and their fans151.
None of this is to say that a true copyright infringement should be excused on the basis of
someone posting a “no intent to infringe” notice on her derivative work. The idea here is that
maybe intent could capture some of the more salient aspects of copyright infringement ex ante –
especially the question whether the potential infringer had a commercial profit motive that might
compete with the copyright holder’s commercial exploitation of the work. Considering this issue
in the context of the initial infringement question might be a better approach than relegating the
commercial competition point to the fair use defense152. In the latter context, the intent question
might get lost in the balancing of the other fair use factors. Allowing the intent factor to stand on
its own in the initial infringement inquiry might better focus market participants, and ultimately
courts, on the realities of Web 2.0 interactions. In other words, it may be better to bring
copyright law more in line with existing aims and expectations of copyright stakeholders than to
educate those parties about laws and policies that are out of touch with the realities of modern
online interactions.
B. What Creators Want: Autonomy versus Profit
The first and fourth case studies illustrate what we might learn from the blogosphere
about the desires and motivations of authors with respect to their own original creations, as
distinct from the needs of their commercial producers and distributors. The first case study
involved Stephenie Meyer’s views on the unauthorized online dissemination of her uncompleted
work, Midnight Sun. The fourth case study involved the unauthorized Robert Pattinson fan
bloggers’ complaint about a commercial DVD producer that misappropriated its web content.
Unlike the focus of traditional copyright discourse involving commercially motivated producers
and distributors, the individual authors in these two case studies were more concerned with
interests traditionally associated with moral rights. In neither case were the authors openly
concerned about the impact of the wrongdoer’s conduct on their own ability to commercially
profit from their work. Rather, Meyer was concerned about her ability to control the form in
which readers ultimately experienced her work, and the bloggers were concerned that their work
was taken without their consent. They might possibly have consented if they had been asked or
if their work had been attributed to them.
With respect to Meyer’s concerns, even though she expressed herself on her blog as
being concerned about copyright infringement, her key complaint seemed to relate to what a
European lawyer might describe as a moral right - notably the right of integrity153. This is the
right to control the form in which a work is exposed to the public154. In jurisdictions with moral
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rights law, the right of integrity subsists in the author independently of copyright. The copyright
may be assigned to another person, but the right of integrity remains in the hands of the author
and is sometimes exercised in tension with the rights of the copyright holder155. Thus, for
example, a copyright holder may want to display a work of art in a particular way: say, by
printing copies on a tee shirt. While copyright ownership may allow this, an author could object
to the use under the right of integrity. The United States has enacted only very limited moral
rights legislation, under the Visual Artists’ Rights Act156. These rights do not extend to authors
such as Meyer157.
The United States has argued that copyright law, augmented by trademark and unfair
competition law does much of the work in the United States that moral rights law does in other
jurisdictions158. Alongside exercising some control through copyright – where the author holds
copyright in a work she has created – the author may also be a trademark holder with respect to
her work because her name is a source indicator with respect to the work159. Thus, if someone
else makes a use of the work in commerce in a misleading, deceptive or confusing way or,
perhaps more to the point, in a way that dilutes the author’s name as a mark, that person could be
subject to trademark liability. So, for example, an author might argue that the presentation by
someone else of her work – particularly in a form in which she would not have released the work
– dilutes her name as a mark in the commercial book market.
Interestingly, on her blog, Meyer does not assert trademark interests in this way, but
speaks only of copyright infringement160. There are likely a variety of reasons for this. Meyer
did not want to bring an action against those who released her draft manuscript for Midnight Sun
over the Internet. Thus, in many ways it does not matter what right she asserts here, because she
is not intending to bring an action. As an expressive matter – to express issues relating to the
rights of an author over her work – copyright probably makes more sense in this context than
trademark. At least copyright is the law nominally aimed at author’s rights, while trademark law
is aimed at commercial markets. As a corollary to this point, in order for an author to bring a
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successful trademark infringement or dilution action, the defendant has to have used the author’s
mark in commerce. Where anonymous online bloggers have posted an unauthorized early draft
of someone else’s work online, it is not clear that those bloggers have acted in commerce as
required by trademark law. While some courts have taken the view that anything posted online
could be in commerce for trademark purposes161, other courts have not accepted this view162.
Another challenge for Web 2.0 copyright law in the context of individual authors is lack
of education about how copyright law works, or rather lack of a better – or more tailored – legal
avenue to get at what those authors really want. While Meyer probably does understand at least
the basic elements of copyright law, she uses it as the closest legal analog she can find for rights
she wants to assert in her work. Even if her concern is with integrity of the work, rather than
economic rights, copyright does technically give her the legal right to control what others do
with the work without her permission.
In the fan blog context, on the other hand, the bloggers themselves seemed to have little
to no grasp of the nature of their legal rights. They had a sense that they had been wronged by
the producer of the Robsessed DVD, but they were unable to put their finger on their exact legal
rights. They framed their initial complaint in terms of the crime of plagiarism. A letter to the
DVD producer framed in these terms appears to have achieved their desired end of putting a stop
to the unauthorized misappropriation of their work. However, the bloggers at the time of their
complaint had no clear knowledge of their legal rights. In fact, as described in Part II.E.1, the
bloggers’ legal rights were probably much more extensive than they realized. They may have
had grounds for successful copyright and trademark infringement claims against the DVD
producer. They might have secured an injunction and potentially also a damages award. While
the bloggers stated that they were not interested in money, and they just wanted Revolver to stop
making unauthorized use of their content163, it is possible that their initial views would have been
different if they had a better awareness of their potential legal rights.
These Meyer and “robsessedpattinson” scenarios suggest a couple of things about the role
of individual authors in the Web 2.0 copyright matrix, particularly now that consumer-creators
like fan bloggers are beginning to attempt to assert legal rights in their work. For one thing,
these case studies suggest that more has to be done in terms of public education so people know
what their rights are in relation to works they create online. A corollary to this is that perhaps
161
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mechanisms should also be developed to make access to enforcement of those rights easier than
is currently the case. For example, if the letter of demand had not worked for the Pattinson fan
bloggers, they may not have been able to afford the costs of litigation against Revolver and thus
knowledge of their legal rights may have been of little practical use.
These case studies also demonstrate that copyrights are often only a proxy for what many
authors really want in terms of control of their literary and artistic works. Despite the disdain of
many economically developed countries for moral rights, it might be worth reconsidering that
position in the Web 2.0 context. Web 2.0 technologies allow more to be done with the works of
others without their authorization. Thus, rights to attribution and integrity arguably take on a
greater importance. Of course, the downside to creating more rights of authorship in this
context, is that those wanting to utilize existing works to create mashups online may run into
trouble against rights of attribution and integrity. While attribution may not be much of a
problem in practice if a good faith remix artist is prepared to acknowledge her sources publicly,
integrity could be a problem if an original artist objects to the content of the remix. Thus, even if
a remixer obtains copyright permission to create the remix, or successfully asserts a fair use
defense, she could still face difficulties if the author of a source work independently asserts an
action based on the moral right of integrity.
Regarding the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies as a potential reason to revisit the
moral rights question in the United States necessitates considering a balance of moral rights of
authors against others participating in the Web 2.0 culture. This balance may not be easy to
strike in practice, and it may be that ultimately the costs of adopting moral rights outweigh the
benefits in terms of facilitating creativity online. However, the moral rights debate has not yet
played out in the Web 2.0 context in the United States. Even if moral rights are ultimately
rejected in this context, such discussions may lead to a greater awareness as to how copyright,
trademark, and unfair competition law might apply in Web 2.0 forums to protect the rights of
individual authors while not unnecessarily impinging on commercially neutral remixing
activities.
C. Fair Use in the Blogosphere
The second case study – and to some extent, the fourth - raise questions about whether
the fair use defense to copyright infringement is working – or indeed can work - effectively in
the Web 2.0 context. The second case study involved fan remixes of copyright works while the
fourth focused on an unauthorized Robert Pattinson fan blog. The challenge for the fair use
defense in the Web 2.0 context relates to aspects of the defense that have always existed, but that
come into sharp focus because of the sheer number of downstream consumer-creators online
making derivate works164. The American fair use defense takes an equitable rule of reason
approach to excusing copyright infringements on the basis of a number of factors now set out in
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§ 107 of the copyright act165. This differs from the position in most other countries where more
clearly delineated rules for fair dealing have been established166. The American approach has
both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages inhere in its flexibility of application to new
situations. The disadvantages are that the application of the defense in any given scenario is
inherently uncertain, and no clear determination on fair use can be gleaned outside actual
litigation. Thus, there is no ex ante guidance as to whether a particular use of a copyrighted
work will be a fair use or not.
This can be particularly challenging in the Web 2.0 context because of the sheer number
of people who might assert fair use online, the geographical mix of regions in which those
people might reside, and the variety of activities engaged in by the remix culture. Previously,
most fan uses of copyrighted works involved verbatim copying for purely consumptive personal
use167. Today, consumers become creators as a result of the cheap and easy accessibility of
recording and remixing technologies. Thus, consumer-creators’ relationships to copyrighted
works tend to be more interactive and the resulting creations more transformative. American
courts have made much in the past of the need for a transformative use of a copyrighted work
under the first fair use factor in § 107 to support a fair use defense168.
While fans’ creations are more transformative than ever before, more voluminous than
ever before, and are disseminated across national boundaries at a rate never before possible, the
vagueness of the American fair use defense becomes infinitely more problematic. Particularly
troublesome is the fact that no individual user can know in advance either whether a copyright
holder will object to a given remix, or whether a viable fair use defense is available. Ultimately,
it might only take one or two copyright holders threatening litigation to chill a large amount of
online creation by fans.
There are a number of possible approaches to this difficulty. Law and policy makers
could think about amending § 107, or at least releasing guidelines to clarify the scope of the
section with respect to typical Web 2.0 remixing activities. In particular, guidance about the
application of the fair use defense to typical noncommercial remixing activities would be useful.
As noted in Part II.C.2, it may be that case that many noncommercial activities would, in fact, be
found to be fair uses if the cases were ever litigated in court. This is because of the significance
that tends to be attached by courts in applying the fair use defense to the first and fourth fair use
factors – the nature and purpose of the use, and the likelihood of the defendant’s activity to
encroach into a market of the copyright holder. The first and fourth fair use factors are the ones
that tend to go to the heart of most copyright holders’ complaints. This is because copyrights
have become predominantly economic rights in modern markets and most complaints by
commercial copyright holders are aimed at protecting their profits.
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If most noncommercial remixes and blog posts are likely to fall under the rubric of fair
use, it may be a good idea for Congress or the Copyright Office to adopt a clear guideline to this
effect. This may be easier to achieve than waiting for a judicial determination because it gives
clear ex ante guidance to participants in the blogosphere, and Web 2.0 society generally, as to the
scope of legitimate activities involving copyrighted works. Some commentators have suggested
other avenues to create ex ante guidance about the scope of fair use rights in general, and these
thoughts could be usefully applied in the Web 2.0 context169.
IV. Conclusions
This article has utilized a series of case studies revolving around the Twilight book and
movie franchise to illustrate some of the challenges inherent in applying intellectual property law
to Web 2.0 forums. While the Twilight Saga has no special significance with respect to
intellectual property, the combination of its global popularity and the open relationship between
its author and her fans creates an extremely useful backdrop for discussions of Web 2.0
intellectual property issues. Meyer and her fans have proved to be very articulate in voicing the
concerns of authors and consumer-creators with respect to appropriate online uses of copyrighted
works.
While no one stakeholder’s views should necessarily outweigh those of others in debates
about online intellectual property protection, the discourse up until now has focused largely on
the economic needs of commercial producers and distributors of copyrighted works. Web 2.0
technologies not only raise challenges to the existing balance of interests, but also create a forum
from which it is possible to extract information about the interests of groups whose voices have
previously been rarely heard in debates on copyright policy. The case studies presented in this
article are intended as an illustration of how this anecdotal data can be used to identify directions
for future debates about digital copyright policy.
From these case studies, we can extract information about issues like the difficulties of
identifying the role of intention within civil and criminal copyright law, and of identifying the
boundaries of the fair use defense online. Additionally, we can obtain useful and detailed
information about the rights that individual authors want to assert with respect to their works, as
distinct from rights that commercial producers and distributors seek to enforce. Web 2.0
technologies also facilitate interactions between the different stakeholder groups with respect to
online copyrights. These increased interactions between creators, commercial producers, and
fans could assist in the development of more effective norms and market practices in relation to
copyrighted works in the future.
This article has not attempted to resolve challenges currently facing copyright policy in
the age of Web 2.0 technologies. Rather, it has suggested that information gleaned from online
forums might create a useful starting point for debates about future directions in copyright law.
The blogosphere is a salient, and often overlooked, source of information about balancing
169

Jerome Reichman, Graeme Dinwoodie, and Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to
Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyright Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH L J 981 (2007);
Jacqueline Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA’s Anti-Device
Provisions, 19 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 111 (2005).

Copyrighting “Twilight”

43

competing interests in copyright works. Law and policy makers might use this information to
great advantage at very little cost when further updating copyright law and policy.

